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Technology Choice and its Performance: Toward a 
Sociology of Software Package Procurement 
Abstract 
Technology Acquisition is an important but neglected issue within the social science 
analysis of technology. The limited number of studies undertaken reproduce a schism 
between rationalist (e.g., economic) forms of analysis, where the assumption is that 
choice is the outcome of formal assessment, and cultural sociological approaches which 
see choice as driven by the micro-politics of the organisational setting, interests, 
prevalent rhetorics, fads, etc. While sympathetic to the latter critical view, we are 
dissatisfied with the relativist portrayal of technology selection: that decisions, beset with 
uncertainties and tensions, are divorced from formal decision making criteria. Influenced 
by Michel Callon’s writing on the ‘performativity’ of economic concepts and tools, we 
argue that formal assessment has a stronger relationship to technology decisions than 
suggested by cultural sociologists. We focus on a procurement which is characterised by 
high levels of organisational tension and where there is deep uncertainty about each of 
the solutions on offer. We show how the procurement team are able to arrive at a decision 
through laboriously constructing a ‘comparison’. That is, they attempt to drag the choice 
from the informal domain onto a more formal, accountable plane through the 
mobilisation and performance of a number of ‘comparative measures’ and criteria. These 
measures constituted a stabilised form of accountability, which we describe through the 
metaphor of a ‘scaffolding’, erected in the course of the procurement. Our argument is 
threefold: first, we argue that comparisons are possible but that they require much effort; 
second, that it is not the properties of the technology which determines choice but the 
way these properties were given form through the various comparative measures put in 
place; and finally whilst comparative measures might be imposed by one group upon 
others in a procurement team, these measures remain relatively malleable.  
 
Keywords: Procurement; Performativity; Decision Making; Software Packages; 
Organisational Politics; Comparative measures 
1. Introduction 
As with many topics in the social sciences the debate surrounding the choice and 
purchase of technologies is polarised across a number of incommensurable positions. A 
major line of argument has been between, on the one hand, technocratic analyses 
advanced, for example, by economics, management and engineering accounts, where the 
assumption is that sufficient information is available about the properties of artefacts to 
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enable rational choice to be made, and, on the other, more sociological and critical 
approaches which emphasise the profound uncertainties surrounding procurement, the 
consequent contestability of claims about the properties of technology, and the 
‘negotiability’ of the criteria used to assess objects. In this latter view, the choice of one 
technology over another is seen to reside not in the objective properties of the artefact as 
revealed by a formal technical or economic assessment but to be, of necessity, refracted 
through or, in some accounts, driven by the micro-politics of the organisation, the 
commitments of the various actors, prevalent rhetorics, fads, etc (Grint & Woolgar, 1997; 
Neyland & Woolgar, 2002).  
While sympathetic with the critical account, we are dissatisfied with the relativist 
outcome and portrayal of technology selection as divorced from formal decision making 
criteria, particularly when it seems to us that procurement is subject to powerful, albeit 
complex, rationales. In contrast, we suggest that the formal assessment criteria adopted 
guide and transform the technology selection process. Our thinking is influenced by the 
work of those scholars who have become sensitive to the interrelationship between these 
two positions. In particular the work of Michel Callon (1998, 1999, Callon & Muniesa, 
2005) and Donald MacKenzie (1992, 2004, 2005) which has examined the contrasting 
explanations that economists and sociologists offer for the functioning of economic and 
financial markets. They both suggest that the gulf that exists between these two 
viewpoints is unhelpful. MacKenzie (1992) raised the idea that these disciplines offer 
tools with different kinds of explanatory power. Economic tools he suggests are well-
honed for assessing the aggregate outcomes of highly regularised behaviour; where there 
are more or less formal criteria in play. Sociological tools (and here he refers to 
contemporary actor-centred accounts) are best honed for exploring the particularities of 
behaviour in their more or less unique historical geographical and social setting. Callon 
too focuses on the efficacy of the tools that both disciplines bring to bear but he takes the 
discussion further by investigating why one set of explanatory mechanisms appears to be 
more successful than the other. His conclusions, which have sparked an intense debate in 
the field of economic sociology and beyond, are that certain theories and tools not only 
describe but help to create the settings in which they are applied. In other words, certain 
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theoretical constructs appear to more accurately describe their setting because they are 
performed in (and in so doing help constitute) that setting.  
It is the notion of ‘performance’ (and ‘performativity’) which is crucial here. The term 
suggests that certain phenomena are, to a substantial degree, brought into existence and 
sustained through the actual ‘doing of them’ (MacKenzie, 2005, 9; Callon, 2004). Callon 
and MacKezie have applied this concept in economic sociology to explain how markets 
may be brought into being. Callon suggests that if people are to trade and purchase goods 
in a ‘market’ (as opposed to any of the other ways the exchange of goods might occur) 
then the market has to be continually performed. The strength of his work lies in the 
conceptual framework he introduces to show this performance. For instance, he discusses 
and confirms the existence of ‘homo economicus’, suggesting that economic man does 
indeed exist but only because “he” is brought into being through a process of 
‘disentanglement’ and. ‘framing’1. It is because of disentanglement/framing says Callon 
that actors can make decisions which appear ‘calculated’ and ‘rational’. Callon also 
introduces a third term, ‘overflowing’, to emphasise the constant need to reframe as new 
information relevant to the decision comes forward.  
Petter Holm (2002) describes how in Callon’s approach actors and objects are so 
thoroughly entangled in ‘sticky cultural contexts’ that these processes of framing and 
disentanglement are crucial if market actors are to evaluate and calculate the likely results 
of their decisions: buyer and seller must be constructed as ‘autonomous agencies’ and the 
object to be sold must be constructed as stable and commodity-like. Importantly, the 
mechanism that enable this decontextualisation are not part of ‘human nature’ but have to 
be actively constructed (ibid). To put it more in the terms we want to develop in this 
article, various assessment and comparative measures must be defined, constructed and 
put in place if framing and disentanglement are to take place. Paraphrasing Holm, the 
more taken for granted, embedded, and ‘thing-like’ these measures become, the more 
effective they will be in untangling objects from their social, cultural and technological 
contexts, and thus enabling actors to make the calculated decision they desire (ibid). 
                                                 
1 The concept of framing, building on Ervin Goffman’s sense of the term, describes the drawing of boundaries around the information and things actors should take 
into account during economic transactions. Disentanglement, drawn from the work of Nicholas Thomas (1991), emphasizes the relations that have to be detached if 
transactions are to occur (as in the transforming of a ‘gift’ into a ‘good’).   
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These are important ideas, which, if they can be applied to the study of decision making 
during economic transactions, can also be useful for understanding the choice of one 
technology over another.  
2. Research Aim 
This paper argues that technology choice and purchase should not be reduced to one 
single dimension (either the outcome of rational decision making or the result of 
discursive struggles). Rather it is the interaction and tension between these two positions 
that is interesting and that should be explored. We point to how scholars investigating 
technology selection within the Information Systems and Technology Studies traditions 
have struggled to deal adequatedly with what might be thought of as a ‘twilight’ or ‘grey’ 
space (Tierney & Williams, 1990). One side of the debate fails to take into account the 
variety of measures – particularly non-quantitative measures – that are used to inform and 
stablise a decision (Lucas et al, 1988; Heiskanen et al, 2000; Kunda & Brooks, 2000). 
The other downplays the possibility that formal assessment occurs at all (Neyland & 
Woolgar, 2002). If some kind of formal process does occur this is portrayed as mere 
‘ritual’ or ‘ceremony’ (Tingling & Parent, 2005). We argue for and develop an alternative 
approach to technology selection in such grey spaces. Although an uncomfortable place 
to operate within, we argue that these are the spaces with which Information Systems 
research should be concerned. Our own response to the schism is that, rather than reduce 
technology choice to one or other position, we wish to keep the tension between them 
open. We do this in two ways: firstly, through showing how assessment and comparative 
measures are performed; and secondly through showing how these measures can come in 
different forms (i.e., they are not simply quantitative measures – see Callon & Muniesa 
(2005) and Callon & Law (2005)). 
Our interest is in how a Procurement Team (hereafter ‘the Team’) attempts to put the 
various properties of the systems on a common plane – to disentangle and frame them - 
so that a selection can be made. They attempt to come to a decision through constructing 
a ‘like for like’ comparison of the different software packages. Comparison does not 
occur easily (or spontaneously) but instead requires much effort in disentangling the 
systems from their existing contexts and framing the decision so that only certain 
information is taken into account. This work of disentangling/framing revolves around 
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the establishment of a ‘system of comparison’ or a number of ‘comparative measures’. 
These measures come in many forms: some pre-exist the procurement (‘value for 
money’,  the ‘fit’ of the systems etc.,) and others are established during the process (the 
‘provenance’ and ‘status’ of the technology, the ‘competence’ and ‘standing’ of the 
suppliers, being able to ‘see’ a working system, and so on). In describing these measures 
we see no reason why we should limit ourselves to those things that are conventially seen 
as assessment criteria (‘fit’ and ‘price’ say) and include much broader issues (e.g. 
regarding the future behaviour and the survival of vendors) around which knowledge and 
criteria are more amorphous and difficult to determine. The important thing is to 
understand what are the measures which help detach the properties of the various systems 
from their contexts and allow the choice to be framed. The actual status of these measures 
(on which side of the schism they belong) appears to us as relatively unimportant (Callon 
& Law, 2005).  
In describing this grey space we are not limiting ourselve to an easy case. The acquisition 
described here exemplifies all the organisational exigencies that one might expect around 
an information system procurement (and if anything is more complex as the procurement 
was part of a failed attempt at a joint venture partnership). There is also much uncertainty 
about the nature of the software packages being procured (many of the systems being 
offered were only ‘partially’ built). Our argument is threefold. First, we suggest that 
comparison is possible but that the construction of these measures requires much effort. 
To reflect this effort, we describe these comparative measures as a kind of decision-
making ‘scaffolding’ that is erected as the Team move towards the procurement decision: 
it is through building up this comparative scaffolding that the Team attempt to 
disentangle the various software packages and map out their shape and boundaries. 
Second, it is through the establishment of this scaffolding that the properties of the 
objects within their intended context of application as well as the comparative 
relationship they have to each other are actually framed. Finally, what makes our case 
particularly interesting was no one actor was able to completely frame the process. Whilst 
certain members of the Team sought to propose (sometimes ‘impose’) comparative 
measures on others, these measures (these parts of the scaffolding) were subject to 
considerable uncertainty and tension (disentanglement and framing may break down). 
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What this suggested was that these kinds of assessments are to a significant extent locally 
produced and that the local context is important (and there is considerable discretion with 
regard to which comparative measures are enacted and how). The framework also 
allowed us to distinguish different contexts in terms of the level of local discretion and 
changes in the external context (e.g. in our case European competition law) which 
impinged upon this. 
Our case material is based on an ethnographic study that one of the authors conducted at 
a large UK public institution (which we call ‘Melchester Council’) over the period of a 
year. The system they were attempting to procure is a ‘Customer Relationship 
Management’ (CRM) system. We begin the paper by contrasting how technology choice 
has been depicted within the Economics, Software Engineering, Information System and 
Technology Studies literatures. Then, before moving onto our empirical material, we 
describe some of the more practitioner-based views of software selection as well as some 
of the research issues relevant to the study of software package procurement. Finally, we 
focus on how the software choice is produced in four different ways: the collection of 
‘testimonies’ from existing users; visiting reference sites; soliciting expert advice, and 
witnessing the software in action. 
3. Theories of Technology Choice 
3.1. Formal Comparison 
In economics and management, procurement is typically portrayed as a process of 
selection between different products. The emphasis on ‘selection’ is telling, as it suggests 
the existence of two or more possibilities which will be compared to understand 
differences and similarities. Underpinning this view is the notion that the specific 
capacities of the objects can not only be identified but that they are intrinsic to the 
technologies and are a determining factor in choice. In other words, properties are 
amenable to objective assessment, even in cases where the complexity of the product 
makes such assessment difficult (Lucas et al, 1988; Kunda & Brooks, 2000). The role of 
adopters is thus to collect ever more information about those properties, such that 
artefacts can be compared to explain how they differ or resemble one another. Once the 
characteristics of the systems have been laid out for all to see, then the presumption is 
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that they can be ranked, as in cost benefit analysis, for instance, where technologies are 
compared through placing their costs and benefits on a common economic plane 
(Heiskanen et al, 2000). In a perfect market, ‘price’ is often seen to be the means by 
which such comparisons can be conducted, such that the price alone will give the 
necessary information for purchasers to make a decision (Williamson, 1991). This would 
seem to apply to software which is becoming commodified and sufficiently standardised 
that the term ‘software package’ is often used (Brady et al. 1992).  
At the same time, there has been extensive discussion of software as an ‘informational 
product’ and the difficulties in ranking a commodity whose characteristics are not readily 
ascertained (Williamson, 1985). Close to the economic and management view, though 
differing in some important respects is the position found within computer science and 
software engineering. Here, the major focus revolves around not how each of the systems 
compare with each other, but how they compare with the needs of the adopting 
organisation. How, in other words, they might ‘fit’ organisational requirements. The term 
attempts to categorise the commensurability between organisational requirements and the 
properties of the software packages on offer; i.e. the software which is most 
commensurable with organisational needs is said to have the best fit (Finkelstein et al, 
1996).  
3.2. Indeterminacy of Properties and Measures 
Whereas the more quantitative approaches have portrayed procurement as organised 
around a narrow set of criteria, this view has been the subject of criticism. Technology 
studies, organisational studies, and information systems research, by contrast, have 
shown how technology choices are the result of a more complicated social and political 
process. Various accounts describe how there are often multiple, competing and 
contradictory assessments of the character and capacities of technologies – perhaps 
because they are new, complex or controversial. In much of this work the choice of one 
technology over another is seen not to reside in the properties of the artefact as revealed 
by a formal technical or economic assessment but necessarily refracted through, or, in 
some accounts, driven by the micro-politics of the organisation, the commitments of the 
various actors, prevalent supplier rhetorics, managerial fads, etc (Pettigrew, 1973; Swan 
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& Clark, 1992; Knights & Murray, 1994; Koch, 2000, 2001; Tingling & Parent, 2004; 
Howcroft & Light, 2006). Many from a discourse theoretic position end up following a 
position close to Steve Woolgar (Grint & Woolgar, 1997) in his insistence that the 
material properties of artefacts are essentially unknowable and thus that the role of 
analysis is to reveal the discursive practices through which one interpretation wins out 
over another (Bloomfield & Danieli, 1995; Joerges & Czarniawska, 1998; Rappert, 
2003).  
Similarly just as technology choice is not dictated by the properties of an artefact, nor, in 
this position, is there seen to be a determinate relationship between formal assessment 
criteria and the purchase decision. Neyland and Woolgar, discuss the rationale behind the 
decision to purchase a database within a university, and argue that formal criteria like 
‘value for money’ figured as a “…background relevancy throughout…[but] only 
informed participants activities in a highly indeterminate sense” (Neyland & Woolgar, 
2002, 271). Having a much greater bearing was the ability of the procurement team to 
‘persuade’ their colleagues that they had taken all such measures into account: 
…the ‘value’ in our value for money story was constructed in the process of 
convincing those connected to particular circuit flows and receiving verification 
from those connectors that we had accounted correctly, that we had judged value 
correctly and that the university should spend this money (272). 
The form of analysis advanced by Woolgar and co-workers suggests that we should 
question and unpack unexplicated assumptions about technologies as well as the 
measures used to assess them. However in doing so it reduces the particularities of the 
decision making setting to a political or rhetorical struggle. The decision criteria are seen 
as marginal to the decision, and, if not entirely removed from the equation altogether, are 
seen as indeterminate.2 Whilst reading Woolgar’s previous work we learn that assessment 
measures should be seen as the outcome and not simply the cause of the procurement 
(Grint & Woolgar, 1997). We agree. However we need to go further than this. In our 
view it would be difficult to fully understand the procurement decision - how comparison 
                                                 
2 This reductionist form of analysis is deeply unsatisfactory. Woolgar’s position has been the subject of a sharp debate with the late Rob Kling (the ‘guns and roses 
debate’ reviewed in Grint & Woolgar (1997) and McLoughlin (1999). Our critique here is more particular: that it reduces complex obdurate decision processes to an 
epiphenomenon of the underlying political processes, and portrays the actors as duped by this process. There may, of course, be cases where technology was acquired 
on the strength of compelling supplier promises, divorced from artefactual affordances, or through the efforts of influential managerial elites. Moreover, the 
simplifying lens of cultural sociology removes our ability to distinguish between different instances of procurement and see how decision processes could be 
configured and played out differently in different settings.  
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across the different technologies was achieved - if we did not give some role to 
assessment criteria. How could properties be produced if it were not for these measures? 
The fact that numerous measures can be established to help produce and compare the 
characteristics of technologies and the lengths certain actors go to establish these 
measures is more interesting and important than Woolgar suggests.  
Underpinning our own analysis is the view that analysis should not reduce phenomena to 
a rhetorical struggle. Rather we see technology choice as the ‘co-production’ of both 
assessment measures and the decision. That is, these measures bridge the decision-
makers and the objects of decision (i.e. artefacts and their vendors). This co-production 
view moves us away from the Woolgarian idea that any assessment is possible or that 
assessment might become uncoupled from the organisational reality. In this respect we 
needs tools that are honed to identify the particularities of decision making in what we 
call this ‘twilight’ or ‘grey’ spaces (Tierney & Williams, 1990). The strength of a such an 
approach rests on its ability to produce analyses of assessment and decision-making that 
go beyond the gulf between technocratic, ‘rationale decision making’ models and the 
emphasis on ‘discursive practices’ or ‘rituals’ advanced by more critical approaches. Our 
view shares elements of, but at the same time differentiates itself from, the analytical 
outcomes of relativist sociology. 
While we have highlighted those studies of technology selection on either side of the 
schism, there is in fact existing work which has looked to bridge these dimensions. 
Tingling & Parent (2005), for instance, describe a procurement decision that is the 
outcome of a ‘judgement’ and which is only later justified through more formal 
mechanisms. Since the decision appears divorced from the formal process they describe 
these in terms of ‘ritual’ and ‘ceremony’. Their argument, which we in principle support, 
is that ‘rationality and ceremony’ need not be in ‘conflict’ but could in fact be 
‘complementary’ (349). The weakness in their paper is that rather than continue to 
develop this line of thinking they eventually conclude in fairly conventional way, 
reducing the discussion down to one side of the schism, stating: “Decision processes and, 
therefore, the decisions themselves, may be socially constructed” (349).  
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3.3. The Social Life of Software Packages 
Interestingly, recent practitioner based literatures, arising from specialist bodies 
providing expert advice to adopters, have presented a more sophisticated view of 
software procurement than either the economic or sociological ones - capturing 
something of the ‘grey space’ that is being described here. They point to how criteria 
over and above price and product features are important when making procurement 
decisions. Not only is there an increasing number of (non-price as well as price) variables 
to consider but there is often uncertainty about which are the important ones (Stefanou, 
2001; Herschel & Collins, 2005). This literature – as well as some writing within the 
Information Systems tradition (Oliver & Romm, 2000) - undermines the notion that 
technical characteristics and fit can be ascertained through observation of the product or 
even ‘testing’, pointing out that a software package can only really be tested through 
actually buying the package and installing it (Bansler & Havn, 1996). A common way of 
emulating the latter is for potential adopters to visit ‘reference sites’ where the software is 
being used. However this can bring its own set of problems. There may be few if any 
reference sites in the adopter’s specific domain. Even where reference sites exist there 
may be uncertainties about how similar the demonstrator organisation is to the potential 
adopter. Likewise, given difficulties in assessing such a complex, non-material product as 
software, as well as its malleability (the scope to adapt and customise software), there are 
questions as to whether the system being demonstrated is the same or sufficiently similar 
to the one being procured? These issues raise points relevant to the discussion of our 
case.  
Software packages are often conceptualised as a product or commodity and discussions 
of their commodification tend to focus on their stabilisation and standardisation (Brady at 
al., 1992; Quintas, 1994). We however seek to conceptualise them in more fluid terms – 
rather than simple ‘snap shots’ we should study the life-cycle of software packages and 
their longer-term evolution across multiple cycles of development and implementation, 
their ‘biography’ and ‘career’ (Pollock et al, 2003). As an example of this approach, we 
see that many of the organisational software systems constructed nowadays are ‘generic’ 
software rather than systems tied to a specific locale. These generic packages are 
constantly being ‘recycled’ for use in different industrial sectors and are thus explicitly 
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designed with the idea that they will be applied beyond the place(s) for which they were 
originally designed. Many CRM systems, for instance, are of this kind - described by one 
set of practitioners as ‘retooled version[s] of generic functionality’ (Herschel & Collins, 
2005, p2). The upshot is that when choosing between systems, adopters may be assessing 
software that exists in a domain very different to their own. And in this case, the object 
being procured is not simply the software but also crucially the supplier’s future intention 
and ability to modify the system to meet the specific requirements of intended adopter. 
There are also longer term questions as to whether the supplier is committed to the new 
sector, whether they will continue to develop software for this industry (or whether they 
are simply entering the market opportunistically (Herschel & Collins, 2005)).3 In these 
cases what might the adopters assess - the reputation of the software supplier (as indirect 
evidence of their competence and future behaviour) – or something else altogether?  
4. Methodology 
4.1. Arriving After the Event 
There are surprisingly few systematic studies of software package procurement within 
Information Systems research or Technology Studies (though see for instance Koch, 
2001; Tingling & Parent, 2004; Howcroft & Light, 2006). This oversight is somewhat 
paradoxical given the latter’s concern to subject to critical scrutiny the claims and 
capabilities of technology supply. In most cases procurement is briefly introduced prior 
to the ‘implementation story’ (McLaughlin, 1999; Fleck, 1993). The process by which a 
potential customer engages with technologies, selects between them, and then commits to 
a particular supplier would seem to be of particular importance. One, perhaps prosaic, 
reason for this lack of attention is related to its timing and the consequent methodological 
difficulties in capturing procurement. Information system procurement is conducted 
infrequently; the earliest stages may be conducted over short periods of time and in a 
fairly ‘ad hoc’ manner, with decision-making restricted to senior managerial and 
technical elites. By the time a technology selection process is identified and access 
negotiated by social science researchers, many of the key decisions will already have 
                                                 
3 There are also questions about whether the supplier will survive in the sector. Software is an area in which scale economies and network externalities underpin the 
tendency for dominant suppliers to displace others - leaving ‘angry orphans’, users who bought software that did not become the de-facto standard and is no longer 
supported (Swann, 1990) – a factor which may motivate alignment with market leaders; as instanced in the adage “nobody ever got sacked for buying IBM”. 
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been made. As some researchers have noted, the large body of ‘technology 
implementation’ studies have typically been carried out retrospectively at some remove 
from the initial procurement decision, the completion of which underpins the 
identification and selection of the case. Thomas (1994) argues that many researchers take 
the formal procurement decision as the starting point for beginning their study, even 
though many of the issues, relationships and alliances that shape later phases will already 
have been formed during the procurement process itself (the same point is made by 
Tingling & Parent, 2005). The consequence, as McLaughlin et al. (1999) observe, is that 
choice is described by informants as having occurred in a ‘carefully managed’ and 
‘rational’ manner with researchers thus left to rely upon these ‘managerial accounts’ 
(1999: 104). While we agree with these authors about the need for more research into 
procurement, their view perhaps exemplifies the dominant sociological view of formal 
procurement as merely rationalising decisions made by powerful players elsewhere. 
4.2. Research Design 
The development of this study procurement was fortuitous. One of the authors, along 
with a group of management and computer scientists, was investigating the changing 
nature of information systems within the public sector. The research team had negotiated 
access to Melchester Council with the goal of observing a ‘joint venture’ partnership the 
Council was attempting to set up with a large IT company (see below). At the same time, 
the Council were also hoping to purchase a Customer Relationship Management (CRM) 
system; a form of system that allows organisations to capture and manipulate greater 
amounts of information about their customers; as well as ‘integrating’ that information 
across the enterprise. The procurement was seen by many members of the Council as the 
first ‘real test’ of how and whether the partnership would work. Whatever the outcome it 
represented an exceptional opportunity for studying software package procurement, 
particularly in terms of early and extensive access.  
4.3. Data Collection and Analysis 
One of the authors conducted a participant observation at the Council during the period of 
the selection (for almost a year). During this time he sat in on and observed meetings of 
the Procurement Team. There were approximately a dozen of these, during which he 
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would sit quietly taking notes. Sometimes he would be asked for his opinion of what he 
thought of the various solutions on offer and he would respond appropriately. He also 
attended several vendor presentations conducted on the Council premises. On one 
occasion he travelled with the Procurement Team by train when they visited another 
Council in the South of England (‘Bingham’) to view a demonstration of their CRM 
system. Along with the Team he also watched a demo of the Bingham software and 
participated in a visit to their call centre where the software was actually being used. 
Whilst at the call centre, he sat with an operator and watched the taking of calls and use 
of the system. Various written materials that were passed between the Team members 
were also collected, including testimonials from existing users of the potential systems, 
printed out email correspondence between Melchester and the industry analysts Gartner, 
and the typed up notes of telephone conversations with these analysts.  
More formal interviews were also conducted with members of the Team at different 
stages throughout the procurement. These usually lasted an hour or so and were tape 
recorded. Discussions tended to begin by the researcher asking the interviewee to bring 
him up to date on the unfolding procurement story. Subsequent questions were aimed at 
understanding which of the solutions were preferred by the interviewee. Usually the 
interviewer would ask for reasons for particular preferences. Some of the Team members 
were re-interviewed at a later stage in the process, and during theses sessions questions 
tended to focus on whether preferences had changed. We were able to interview one of 
the suppliers, the Sales Director of the firm that eventually won the contract (but only 
some time after the initial procurement process). During this meeting he was asked to 
reflect on the process and why he thought his company had been successful. We were 
unable to talk to the other vendors. Despite requests for meetings, many pointed to 
logistical difficulties (in their work they would be travelling to the Council from different 
parts of the country to deliver presentations, meet with key personnel, and then leave 
quickly the same day, with potential customers to visit in other parts of the country).  
As we began to make sense of and analyse the rich and voluminous amounts of data that 
we had collected, rather than be guided by prior theoretical knowledge, we paid particular 
attention to the terms and concepts used at our sites. This is perhaps one of the most 
appealing features of ethnography: that it promises access to the issues, concepts and 
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categories that are deemed relevant by those in the field, not those imposed a priori by the 
researcher. The ‘new sociology of technology’ has further applied the ‘symmetry 
principle’ of sociology of science to the analysis of technology. This regards the need to 
suspend belief about ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ in scientific disputes, claims about the success of 
a technology, or its ‘social’ and ‘technical’ dimensions of a technology, if the nature of 
these phenomena are still being negotiated by those under study (Callon, 1986). We 
employed similar sorts of criteria when thinking about assessment measures.  
5. The Case Study 
5.1. The Public Procurement Process and How it Shaped the Procurement Context 
The procurement process had a number of distinctive features rooted in the governance of 
public procurement (the requirement for transparency; the emphasis on price) and the 
trans-organisational character of the system being acquired. Typically public agencies 
have well established and highly regulated processes for procuring new computer 
systems and other infrastructural technologies. Normally, the process would start through 
the issuing of what is called an ‘OJEC’; meaning that a ‘note’ is placed in the Official 
Journal of the European Communities describing the organisation’s requirements and 
inviting interested suppliers to submit comprehensive tender documents. This is a 
complicated administrative and legal framework which seeks to eradicate discriminatory 
purchasing through opening up purchases to broader international competition (Martin et 
al, 1999). One outcome of the OJEC is that there is a general requirement to maintain a 
certain level of transparency during procurement. This was particularly important as past 
decisions were often subject to internal and external audits. A further feature shaping 
public sector procurements was ‘price’: the Council was obliged, like other public 
organisations, to achieve ‘best value’ when making purchases. Finally, the composition 
of the Procurement Team was noteworthy as it was made up of representatives from 
across the organisation and not simply technologists. The major groupings were the 
Customer Services staff, who would be the primary end users of the system, and the IT 
personnel. There were also a project manager, a Chairperson, and two from other parts of 
the Council (the Housing Benefits Section and the Environmental Department). 
  15
5.2. Stage One: Bringing Options to the Table 
5.2.1. Offering One 
Melchester Council were, as noted, in the process of establishing a joint venture 
partnership with an organisation we call ‘JV Partner’. JV Partner’s first task was to 
advise Melchester on the most appropriate CRM solution, which they did, putting 
forward a large US owned software supplier which we will call ‘BigVendor’. JV Partner 
described in its documents how it had something of a ‘unique relationship’ with 
BigVendor and therefore had no hesitation in recommending them and their systems to 
Melchester. Also, as one of the world leaders in the provision of this kind of packaged 
application software, Big Vendor had recently announced they had set their sights on 
becoming the leader in providing CRM to local government. Everything appeared to 
suggest a good future working relationship. BigVendor began to visit the Council to carry 
out initial scoping work and interview staff about their requirements. However, shortly 
after these initial visits, JV Partner announced that it was no longer recommending 
BigVendor but a Latvian/American software house that we are calling ‘MiddleVendor’.  
5.2.2. Offering Two 
MiddleVendor, which up till then was unknown to the Council, visited Melchester and 
conducted a two week ‘discovery session’. After this they made a full-day presentation to 
Council staff, including giving a software demonstration (described below). However, 
during the question and answer session following the presentation, some questions arose 
regarding the exact cost of MiddleVendor’s system and in particular what part of that fee 
would be passed to JV Partner. Despite attempts by MiddleVendor to clarify the issue, 
various members of the Procurement Team left the room highly suspicious about whether 
the Council was getting value for their money. These suspicions were not resolved, only 
heightened, in a later meeting and it was thus decided to invite a number of other 
suppliers to come to the Council so that MiddleVendor’s prices could be compared. 
5.2.3. Offering Three (and Offering One Again) 
A small software house from Northern Ireland, which we call ‘SmallVendor’, had also 
tendered for the project and they too were now invited to visit the Council offices. This 
company was also unknown to the Council, having previously developed software for the 
  16
Telecommunications sector, but had recently implemented its system in one of the largest 
UK local authorities. Also in the same week, and to everyone’s surprise, BigVendor 
contacted the Council to ask if they could have a second chance to present their offering. 
Despite much scepticism (and even some bewilderment) they were invited in once more. 
In summary, then, there were now three possible options on the table between which the 
Team had to decide.  
5.3. Dividing Possibilities 
From the beginning of the procurement process it was clear that each of the options was 
attracting supporters. For instance, one issue the Team spent time discussing was the 
‘type’ of system they should procure and its implications for organisational change. The 
choice was between what was described as a ‘highly prescriptive’ mature solution 
(BigVendor) and the newer, more flexible software packages (MiddleVendor & 
SmallVendor). It was widely understood that BigVendor’s solution would mean applying 
the system’s ‘standard templates’ to the council’s business processes and this would 
involve re-engineering much of the organisation. For Barry, who was Chairing the 
Procurement Team, this was seen as a good opportunity for the Council to update its 
processes. In one meeting he describes how “…there is the pressure to adopt new and 
better practices”; BigVendor’s system templates were presumed to embody best (or at 
least better) practice. And BigVendor’s system “…will provide us with a focus for 
organisational change”. A similar set of points was made by the manager of the Housing 
Benefits section as she too listed the advantages BigVendor’s solution might bring. 
Customer Services staff were less impressed by the BigVendor solution. They 
particularly problematised the generic nature of the package. In stark contrast, however, 
they were openly describing the MiddleVendor solution as ‘brilliant’. The reason for this 
enthusiasm was because, unlike BigVendor’s ‘out of the box’ solution, MiddleVendor 
would be building a software package specifically for Melchester. MiddleVendor did not 
yet have a local government CRM system (their system was being used within the 
Financial Services sector only) and they were thus proposing to use Melchester as the 
‘pilot site’ for this re-development. This was seen in a positive light by the Customer 
Services staff: 
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From a Customer Service point of view it is brilliant. What they are going to offer us is 
everything that we could possible want because they are going to build it around our 
existing systems (Interview with Kerry, Customer Services). 
From a Customer Service point of view, we strongly believe that MiddleVendor could 
deliver what we want (Interview with Christine, Customer Services). 
However, the IT staff within the Procurement Team appeared to favour the third option, 
SmallVendor. From their initial presentation it was said to be the ‘cheapest’ option. 
When pressed to give further reasons they stated how they liked the fact that 
SmallVendor had already developed a version of the CRM system they were promising 
to deliver to Melchester at another council in the UK (‘Bingham Council’). And this was 
seen to give the solution, to use their term, ‘added credibility’. One of the IT managers 
describes how: 
My personal view is that SmallVendor is: the least expensive and delivers what we are 
looking for; comprehensive in looking to the future; and has credibility of working with 
the largest council in the UK (Procurement Team meeting). 
It also meant that Melchester could form some kind of partnership with Bingham to 
develop the CRM system further. Partnerships were being heavily pushed by Government 
and this appeared to offer the possibility of “killing two birds with one stone” (comment 
by the Chair of the Team during a Procurement Team meeting).  
In summary, after the first round of discussions, there was no clear choice emerging;  to 
the contrary, various sections of the Team were becoming closely wedded to different 
solutions. Each had their own criteria for evaluating the packages. One group was 
attracted to the way their favoured system would ‘fit’ with existing processes, another 
thought a standardised system would help modernise and ‘update’ the Council’s business 
processes, and another group saw a third system as attractive because of ‘price’ and the 
fact it had an existing local government customer. In what follows, we will show how the 
Team attempted to unlock this situation through disentangling the systems from their 
existing contexts as a precursor towards achieving the realignment needed to shift 
technology preferences. They did this through introducing new measures by which to 
compare the systems. 
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5.4. Narratives of Success 
Evidence about the software packages was collected in the following ways: through 
observing supplier presentations and demos of their systems; the solicitation and reading 
of testimonials from existing customers (so called ‘reference sites’); and seeking advice 
from third party experts. In this section we will focus on the testimonies and return to the 
other elements later in the paper. The testimonies were made up mostly of written replies 
to questions sent out by the Team concerning the nature of the system and the level of 
service and support provided by the supplier. Telephone interviews were also conducted. 
Completed questionnaires and typed up summaries of telephone conversations were 
passed around members of the Team. These testimonies can be divided into different 
categories. First, many simply described the effective operation of the system without any 
qualification: 
[Our internal people] rave about the savings in man-hours since we implemented 
workflow queues to our operational sections and they can query and print documents 
without having to dig through rolls of microfilm. We have also given query ability to the 
court judges and their staff. They were very pleased and complimentary – US County 
District Clerk talking about MiddleVendor 
Agents can now perform much better. For example with “Case Management” agents can 
now report complicated customer complaints electronically through Frontline for 
resolution at the back-end – SlowLink talking about SmallVendor 
BigVendor’s CRM solution has transformed the way the City Council thinks about IT. 
We are well on target for meeting the Government’s deadline for e-enabling all our 
services by 2005 – Hill Council talking about BigVendor 
There were also those that focused on the role of the suppliers themselves. Like the 
systems descriptions these were usually unconditional in their support: 
To date they have delivered what has been promised – Island Telecom talking about 
SmallVendor 
As a Telecom we work with many vendors within our company, and the solutions we 
develop with MiddleVendor are more of a partnership than a client/vendor relationship. 
The expertise offered in development, the support provided in implementation, and the 
confidence we have in the resulting end production/solution, make working with 
MiddleVendor a pleasant and productive experience – TelCo talking about MiddleVendor  
Intriguingly, when we were able to find discussions of failings, these were almost always 
addressed in a somewhat indirect manner. For instance, authors were careful to show how 
responsibility for problems was distributed among a range of actors:  
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We have experienced some complications that have resulted in the dissatisfaction of the 
staff at various periods, but again, I think the Department’s administrators share some of 
this responsibility – NewState Department of Insurance talking about MiddleVendor 
We did experience some downtime but the majority was our own internal issues, i.e., 
network problems, personnel turnover, and some of it could be directly attributed to 
problems with the custom application written by [a third party vendor] – US County 
District Clerk talking about MiddleVendor 
…most service interruptions have been attributable to our own network and software 
change management – TelCo talking about MiddleVendor 
We would describe the bulk of the documents and references received as ‘narratives of 
success’ (Fincham, 2002). There were very few negative comments made about the 
suppliers and their software systems.4 We can also interpret the insertion of these 
(negative) statements and the counter statements that qualify or explain them as 
‘modalities’, in Latour and Woolgar’s (1986) sense, that they are used to emphasise the 
problematic elements (and perhaps also to add a sense of realism and credibility to these 
testimonials).5 To sum up, this phase of procurement was organised around the collection 
and reading of testimonials. The interesting issue about these narratives is that they were 
uniformly positive and allowed the Team little scope for comparing the various suppliers. 
It appeared that the Team would have to find alternative measures if disentangling and 
framing were to occur.  
5.5. The Provenance and Status of the Software Packages 
One set of issues that began to dominate Team meetings concerned the nature of the 
system that MiddleVendor was promising regarding where it came from, and the kind of 
reference sites that they were offering. As we have said, many generic software packages 
are ‘recycled’ across different industrial sectors. The assumption is that because a system 
has been made to work in one class of organisation it can also be reconfigured for use in 
other settings (or the setting itself can be reshaped to more closely match the newly 
arrived technology, or as more usually occurs there is a combination of both). However, 
this recycling presents difficulties for procurement teams, for they may be assessing 
                                                 
4 Fincham (2002) argues that the users and adopters of IT systems construct these positive narratives because they do not wish to be associated with the ‘stigma of 
failure’. Alternatively, they might also be seen as a rhetoric or device deployed by existing users to encourage potential customers to adopt the system, there being 
positive benefits to be gained from extending the community of users (see below). 
5 Modalities is the term used by Latour & Woolgar (1986) to describe qualifications that appear within a text and have some bearing on how that text is read or 
believed. In their book Laboratory Life they deploy the notion to show how scientists insert doubt about a statement. However we can also use the term in the 
opposite way. In the case of software packages, these modalities appeared to have little effect on the acceptance of narratives. 
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software in settings that are drastically different to their own, as well as software that is 
not yet in the form that has been promised to them. One member of the Team describes 
this difficulty:   
MiddleVendor haven’t got any system anywhere in the world with the mix they are 
proposing to give to us. They have only one site which isn’t yet live in the UK. All the 
sites they mentioned to us in the United States, people visited some of them and had 
lengthy discussions with them, all had bits and bobs of the stuff they were going to give 
to us but no one had much of it working together (Interview with Project Manager). 
References sites are interesting in that they seemingly give prospective adopters the 
reassurance that the software does work in some places at least. However this reassurance 
is only as good as the intellectual comparisons that adopters are able to draw between the 
reference site and their own setting. To the extent that such parallels cannot be 
established – or a recognisable system cannot be demonstrated – the adopter is then 
required to ‘imagine’ what the finished system might look like and how it might operate 
in their environment. In other words, this requires disentangling these ‘bits and bobs’ 
from the specificity of the reference site, imagining them in a different format, and then 
projecting this image onto the Melchester setting. In this case, when presented with a 
number of MiddleVendor’s references sites it appears that the Team were unable or 
unwilling to make these necessary mental leaps, to envisage technologies that did not yet 
exist, and to disentangle the software from the sites in which it was presented (we return 
to this issue later in the paper).  
Interestingly, Ken, who is an IT Manager, describes a similar set of concerns about 
MiddleVendor but also emphasises the danger of selecting a system that did not yet exist: 
Problem with MiddleVendor is high cost, no track record in Europe, in UK. We spent 
time getting references. The people we talked to were very impressive, though their 
presentation was only on paper and there was nothing to see. They would be developing a 
bespoke product for Melchester. We would be guinea pigs (Customer Service 
Workstream meeting). 
Here concerns were raised that MiddleVendor would be building a software package 
specifically for Melchester. Somewhat paradoxically this had initially been seen as a 
highly positive feature of MiddleVendor’s proposal by the Customer Services staff but it 
was now re-cast or reframed as a significant weakness. The Melchester team were unable 
to disentangle the system from the supplier. Would (could?) MiddleVendor stick to its 
promise of adequately reconfiguring its systems so that it was useful in this new setting? 
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There appeared to be an easy way to resolve these questions – to get the suppliers to 
demonstrate their capability.  
5.6. Credibility Contests: Providing Evidence of Competence6 
Establishing credibility is said to be important for software suppliers, especially where 
they are attempting to build new systems or recycle existing systems to new settings.7 
Indeed it was though using the language of credibility that members of the Team sought 
to reframe the procurement and in so doing problematise MiddleVendor: ‘there was 
nothing to see’; and everything they had was ‘only on paper’. In response, during 
MiddleVendor’s visit to the Council they spent time attempting to demonstrate their 
credibility. They did this most explicitly by undertaking a ‘Proof of Concept’ (POC) 
project which was presented as nothing out of the ordinary, as if the supplier was required 
to demonstrate its competence for every potential customer. The supplier’s documents 
describe how:  
Many engagements involve a proof of concept. The proof of concept generally involves 
confirming that the solution will, in fact, solve the most pressing business problems. In 
such cases the back end systems are absolutely unchanged during the project scope. 
Capacity is typically strictly limited so that capacity engineering is not a risk… (p42).  
Once the POC was established as a ‘normal’ part of the procurement process, there was 
an explicit attempt to signal that it was capable of standing-in for a whole range of things: 
the as yet un-established skill and competence of staff and the credibility of the supplier.8 
The objective of the Proof of Concept is to demonstrate to the Melchester IT community 
that MiddleVendor can integrate to Melchester ICL mainframe applications and can 
navigate the Melchester Oracle databases (MiddleVendor Tender Document, p23). 
POC system should demonstrate the ability of MiddleVendor the Integrator component to 
access existing Melchester data systems infrastructure (ibid, p23) 
POC should show the capabilities of the MiddleVendor Portal component (ibid, p23) 
                                                 
6 The notion of a ‘credibility contest’ comes from Tom Gieryn (1999).  
7 The management theorist Michael Cusumano has written about what he calls the ‘credibility gap’; whereby software companies cannot build credibility until they 
have a number of existing customers who can serve as ‘references sites’; and they can not enrol these initial customers until they have some credibility. He suggests 
that new software companies do everything possible to get the first reference customer, even if means “giving the product or service away almost for free” (2004, 
208). And as for larger software companies entering new domains, they can “…transfer credibility they have built up with customers in one market to help them enter 
new markets…” (ibid., 70). Obviously, we can question Cusumano’s discussion of credibility: for instance, the ‘thing like’ status of credibility which he appears to 
suggest that just like the technology can be transferred across boundaries. We know technology is not simply transferred and of course the same can be said of 
‘credibility’.  
8 Proof of Concept is being given a status closer to a demonstrator. In an earlier study we showed the reverse process whereby a publicly funded Research and 
Development project that had not met its original goals was rebranded as a successful Proof of Concept (Williams, Stewart and Slack, 2005). 
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Having flown in programmers from Latvia, it appeared that MiddleVendor sought to 
demonstrate its competence in a dramatic manner through attempting the hardest possible 
case: 
Specifically, POC examines the operations required to establish a customer direct debit 
(‘an arrangement’) for council tax payments. The scenario that the POC is trying to cover 
has been discussed with Melchester users and was agreed would be a good test case of 
the technology due to the complexity and inconvenience of the procedure using the 
mainframe application (p23). 
We say hard case because it requires MiddleVendor to achieve integration between 
several discrete systems. When the day of the POC arrived there was gathered in the 
room the Procurement Team, other members of the Council involved in setting up the 
wider joint venture, and several JV Partner staff. MiddleVendor staff introduced the event 
by announcing that because ‘we are a new company’ and because no-one had yet ‘heard 
of us’ that they wanted to ‘demonstrate their expertise’. Then this is what they attempted 
to do. Apart from some initial problems in getting the system to run, the POC appeared to 
proceed as planned. Through a process they described as ‘screen scraping’ they were able 
to access a number of Melchester databases and run a simulation of how a council officer 
would deal with a typical customer enquiry. Afterwards there appeared to be unanimous 
opinion among those gathered that the MiddleVendor presentation, the POC demo, and 
the expertise of their staff were ‘excellent’. This view of MiddleVendor was repeated 
throughout the Council. One member of the Team for instance stated: 
I have to say that the level of expertise of these people who came in was absolutely 
superb. In fact some of the questions they came back and asked you wouldn’t expect a 
council officer who had been there for several weeks to ask (Interview with Christine, 
Customer Services Manager). 
Significantly, however, not all of the Team appeared as convinced. In a meeting between 
the Team and other Council staff one IT manager casts some doubt on whether the POC 
did in fact tackle a hard case: 
There is proof that they can use tools [to access data] but other tools were already in 
place. I still can’t comment on the robustness of their solution. We have followed up 
references such as the [US State Dept of Insurance]. But references are limited. I would 
like to see a site where integration has been done (Procurement Team Meeting). 
In other words, this Manager was unwilling to allow the POC to stand in for a 
demonstration. He questioned the ability of this measure to really test the supplier. For 
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him ‘real proof’ would be to actually go to a site where the software package was already 
integrated with legacy systems. Another IT manager makes a similar point and also 
questions the long term viability of MiddleVendor: 
I’m impressed with MiddleVendor but we have given them access to our processes which 
we didn’t give to the others. Brian’s [from JV Partner] suggestion that MiddleVendor is 
the best for us is ‘bollocks’. There is more comfort in going with BigVendor as we know 
they’ll [still] be there in several years (Procurement Team Meeting). 
Despite the fact that MiddleVendor were able to visibly demonstrate their expertise, there 
still appear to be concerns about their competence and now, according to this latter 
comment, their viability to survive as an organisation. One way of resolving these 
concerns appeared to be to solicit the opinion of a ‘credible’ other. 
5.7. Have the Experts Heard of Them? 
During the procurement Melchester employed the IT analysts the Gartner Group. 
Analysts like Gartner present themselves as providing ‘impartial’ information about 
particular software systems and the technical and financial standing of suppliers. They 
are experts in the classification and positioning of vendors (see Pollock & Williams, 
forthcoming). Having sought their opinion in the past, Melchester thus turned to them 
once more in order to resolve the questions about MiddleVendor’s longer term viability. 
Several lengthy telephone calls were conducted and the results of each were typed up and 
circulated among the Team. In the first of these calls, Ron, an IT manager asks Gartner 
for their opinion of MiddleVendor and is somewhat surprised to be told by a Gartner 
consultant (‘Ed’) that:  
[Gartner] has a list of some 500 vendors of CRM, many of which [Ed] meets on a regular 
basis to track the development of their products. MiddleVendor is not on the list; he had 
not heard of them (Ron’s circulated notes).  
The consultant said he would cross check with a colleague based in America and call 
back. A week later Ron reports how:  
[Ed] has been in touch with his colleague in the USA, but [that MiddleVendor] were 
unknown to him as well. Gartner can therefore not provide any research papers into the 
company or its products (Ron’s circulated notes).  
What we see here is that through the introduction of these various modalities (they are 
not on Gartner’s list, Gartner had not heard of them, and there were no available research 
papers) that Gartner begins to cast doubt on MiddleVendor’s credibility. The episode 
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becomes more interesting still when Melchester report this to MiddleVendor and they in 
return seek to play down its significance suggesting that it is the result of a simple 
'categorisation' difficulty: 
Their comment when it was pointed out that they were unknown to Gartner was that in 
the two years the company has been in existence it has not spent any time or effort in 
making itself known to industry analysts. This is because at present these companies do 
not have a category for what they are offering (the integrated framework approach) 
(Ron’s circulated notes).  
Here, rather than simply accept Gartner’s assessment, MiddleVendor responds by casting 
doubt upon Gartner itself and its methods of compiling briefing documents. In other 
words, MiddleVendor insert their own modality (‘these companies do not have a 
category’) in an attempt to diminish the significance of these judgements. The matter 
does not end there. Gartner, on being informed of these objections, attempts to clarify 
(defend?) its position by discussing the provenance of its own information:  
Gartner gets 80-90% of its information directly from Gartner clients talking about their 
experiences and technologies and not from being briefed by technology vendors. 
Nonetheless Gartner hosted 150 CRM vendor briefings in Europe last year, of which 30 
or so were instigated at Gartner’s request due to client calls. No client has asked us to ask 
for a briefing from MiddleVendor. It does not mean that MiddleVendor is a bad solution 
– it just surprises us that we have not had a request (Gartner email circulated among the 
Team). 
Now Gartner appear to backtrack somewhat on their initial statement by arguing for a 
lighter form of modality (‘It does not mean that MiddleVendor is a bad solution’). 
Another Gartner consultant makes a similar point a week or two later during a conference 
call. The note on the conversation describes how: 
She advised Melchester not to read too much into the fact that they were not known to 
Gartner. It was in MiddleVendor’s interest not to be classified with other CRM vendors 
as they offer broader services. They did not want to be seen as simply a software vendor. 
They had perhaps failed to take a more pragmatic approach to this (Ron’s circulated 
notes). 
This exchange is interesting for at stake here was the issue of who was qualified to pass 
judgements on suppliers and their technologies. In this sense, Gartner are the 
knowledgeable specialists who analyse the biography and careers of objects: they know 
where the software originated, which other organisations are using it, and they build up 
extensive knowledge, through their contact with these user organisations, ‘talking about 
their experiences’ with the technology. The existence of firms like Gartner is a symptom 
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of the problems user organisations face in assessing claims about software packages (and 
of having to operate in the ‘twilight’ or ‘grey’ space between formal and informal 
knowledge about technologies). This begs two questions: What makes Gartner credible? 
And what does Gartner’s contribution add to the assessment of the MiddleVendor 
system? A credible witness is seen to be a source who could be believed – one who was 
‘impartial’ and had no particular axe to grind (Steven Shapin, 1994), inspiring ‘a just 
confidence’ by applying genteel virtues of ‘integrity and disinterestedness’ (ibid:212). In 
this respect, Gartner do not make public assessments about particular suppliers but 
merely comment on the availability of third party information, presenting themselves as 
the neutral collector and collator of that information. In other words, Gartner do not so 
much produce technical claims but act as the carriers of ‘community knowledge’.  
However, Gartner’s assessments do not close the outcome; there is space for discussion – 
for example about whether their methods may discriminate against MiddleVendor. 
Gartner makes its assessments accountable9. However, the ambiguity opens up space for 
doubt. One reading of this exchange is that Gartner are passing the ultimate judgement on 
the status of each supplier back to the Team. It is the Team who must now decide on how 
to interpret this information. It is they who have the ability to leave the issue open or to 
‘say what is to be seen’ (Munro, 1995, p441). For the IT staff within the Team, however, 
there is little doubt about how to read this report. In one meeting, Neil describes how: 
“Gartner said that with MiddleVendor we would be taking a risk”. Similarly, Fred echoes 
this comment by asking: “Who would sign up to a company that no one has heard of?”10  
It becomes clear that MiddleVendor will be removed from the table when its initial 
supporters, the Customer Services team, begin to articulate and repeat similar views. 
Kerry, who had previously articulated the benefits of MiddleVendor, now presents a 
somewhat different view:   
                                                 
9 In discussing why Gartner are so low key in advancing negative opinion – we have identified how they are desperate to make transparent the source of their 
assessments; they deny that they are acting, but merely carrying knowledge validated by others/elsewhere. There is a parallel with science – both are seeking to make 
their knowledge claims objective and accountable - though scientists tend to validate their claims in terms of objective nature, whilst Gartner refer to community 
knowledge. We discuss this issue in more detail in Pollock & Williams (forthcoming). 
10 He also suggests that choosing MiddleVendor would have implications for them being able to meet the Government’s advice on partnerships: “I view 
MiddleVendor high cost, high risk. If you are expecting other local authorities to buy-in, then, there is a risk of credibility because no one has heard of 
MiddleVendor”. 
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…what we were always doing was chasing a concept. We hadn’t yet seen, and we still 
haven’t seen anything to prove they can do what they say they can. In my mind I have no 
doubt about their professional expertise and ability to deliver something but until we can 
see something physical and some kind of evidence. The Authority has put too much into 
this kind of project to be seen as a pilot for MiddleVendor really within local authorities 
and within the UK even. From what I can gather they have not delivered a CRM system 
in the world, never mind the UK, so we were always going to be guinea pigs. That was 
unsettling a lot of people (Interview with Kerry, Customer Services). 
To sum up, we have seen how the procurement was initially framed and then reframed as 
various comparative measures were introduced and some were recast. While 
MiddleVendor were keen to demonstrate their capability at the outset of the process, 
Team members sought more concrete ‘physical’ evidence of this capacity. Having once 
enthused about the expertise of MiddleVendor, the Customer Services people now too 
sought more evidence. In the end, the result was that the Team came to the conclusion 
that MiddleVendor lacked both an actual software package, and, through Gartner’s 
intervention, credibility.  
5.8. Shifting Technology Preferences 
Several months have passed by now and there is the realisation among the Team that they 
will have to simplify the process significantly if they are going to reach a decision. Barry, 
the senior officer chairing the meetings, attempts to get the group to explicitly identify 
their preferred option:  
We need to make a decision on who we are to go with. The three suppliers, are they any 
good? What do you think of the three products offered so far? We need the technology 
and value for money.  
Going around the table it is the IT experts who speak first and it immediately becomes 
clear that SmallVendor is their favoured option: 
SmallVendor has all the technology required. It is the cheapest with ‘transparent costs’. It 
is the best value for Melchester City Council (Ron, IT Manager). 
SmallVendor looked an excellent solution (Ken, IT Manager). 
This is followed by the remainder of the Team who, because of the strength of opinion of 
the IT staff, are now divided into three separate categories of individuals:  
(1) Those who are convinced by the capabilities of the SmallVendor system and who will 
subscribe to it and support it:  
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Err on side of SmallVendor. MiddleVendor is US and Latvian. SmallVendor is closer to 
home (Kath, Customer Services). 
(2) Those who will reject it outright because they favour another solution: 
BigVendor are arrogant. MiddleVendor are people and service focused. SmallVendor is 
technology driven (Kerry, Customer Services Manager).  
MiddleVendor would do job. I have issues with SmallVendor (Ed, EnviroCall Manager). 
MiddleVendor (Dianne, Housing Benefits Manager) 
(3) Those who are neither for nor against SmallVendor but who seemingly could be 
convinced of the merits of the system: 
SmallVendor appeared committed and had enthusiasm, were new to market, and were 
pleasant. But from a service perspective they would need to demonstrate (Helen, 
Customer Services Director). 
MiddleVendor provides more of what we want. SmallVendor, I didn’t know enough 
about. They didn’t refer to our priority areas at all. We would need to have more 
conversations with them… (Christine, Customer Services Manager). 
SmallVendor haven’t demonstrated that they could do it (Richard, Project Manager). 
Barry attempts to move the meeting forward by focusing not on the criticisms raised by 
the middle group but the possibility of convincing the third group of the merits of the 
SmallVendor system. In so doing, he avoids the need for the whole Team to discuss the 
issues raised by those hostile to the choice. There is clearly as yet no consensus in the 
group as to which system is the better and they continue to evaluate the systems 
according to a wide variety of measures. Barry, rather than go on discussing each and 
every difference for several more hours, attempts a form of rhetorical closure on the 
process by suggesting that they select SmallVendor as the preferred solution. However, 
and he spends considerable time emphasising this point, only if it can be shown to be the 
best system:  
Is that it: SmallVendor is what we need? [there are some nods of agreement from around 
the room]. Our proposition then is to go ahead subject to further checking. Our view is of 
‘caution’. All of this must stack up.  
We describe below how SmallVendor is shown to be the best system, but first, we see 
how JV Partner further complicates the procurement through attempting to introduce 
other assessment measures. 
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5.9. We Are Duty Bound to Get to the Facts 
It had been scheduled that JV Partner staff should join the above meeting, where they 
would be briefed on the progress of the procurement decision. Within the Team there was 
a fear of upsetting the development of the joint venture partnership and this was 
especially troubling since they were now proposing to reject JV Partner’s proposal (of 
MiddleVendor as the best solution for Melchester). The JV Partner people enter the room 
and are asked to present their evaluation of each solution. They do so by pointing out 
how difficult it was to compare each of the packages: “It was a bit like comparing apples 
and pears” describes one member. Despite these difficulties they had managed to put 
together a matrix, choosing to rank the packages according to the ‘risks’ they posed to the 
Council. As expected, they identified MiddleVendor as the least risky solution, then 
BigVendor which was clearly not a ‘good solution’ for the Council, and then 
SmallVendor who they ‘didn’t really know much about’ but despite this still considered 
posed the ‘biggest risks’ to the Council.  
The majority of these risks were linked to the technical capacity and competence of the 
Supplier and also to an extent on JV Partner’s analysis of the future of the CRM software 
package market. It was generally agreed that the SmallVendor system would require 
large amounts of ‘back-end integration’ before it could be made to interface with 
numerous other legacy systems within the Council. This work would be carried out by 
SmallVendor and Melchester staff and, as JV Partner saw it, this was a significant risk: 
SmallVendor have no experience of mainframe integration; [in their presentation] they 
said they had ‘two buddies’ from ICL who can help them out. There will have to be 
bespoke work, and the risk shoots up if Melchester staff do it. We want to ‘de-risk’ it and 
move towards packaged solutions. I wouldn’t be happy with Melchester staff doing the 
integration…Got to push risk back onto the Supplier… (Procurement Team Meeting). 
Another member of JV Partner adds: 
The SmallVendor proposal doesn’t have ‘middleware’. No enterprise is doing [back-end] 
integration these days. At Bingham City Council they are using [a company called] 
Cavendish to do the middleware (Procurement Team Meeting).  
The extent to which SmallVendor was a risk was disputed by members of the Team and 
this led to further uncertainties concerning just what each of the vendors and their 
packages could do. For instance, in response to the comment about the use of middleware 
as opposed to carrying out back-end integration, one Melchester IT Manager (Ken) 
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describes how “this is what we are talking about doing [with SmallVendor]”, only to be 
told by JV Partner that: “No, you’re not suggesting corporate middleware. Only 
MiddleVendor has ‘integrator’ which is corporate middleware”. There was further 
uncertainty regarding how much of the work the Melchester IT personnel would be 
carrying out themselves. While JV Partner thought SmallVendor was risky because it 
would mean using the in-house staff: “we don’t want to rely on in-house staff, we have to 
use packages”, Ken describes how MiddleVendor actually were proposing to use “our 
COBOL skills anyway” and that “we [the in-house personnel] are involved in whichever 
solution we go for”. 
These points highlight the various uncertainties and ambiguities regarding the capacities 
of the technologies and the capabilities and standing of suppliers, and the introduction of 
a further comparative measure (risk) has not lessened but only heightened this. There 
were also a number of tensions developing between the two groups, which Barry attempts 
to deflect by taking the discussion onto a topic where surely they could all find some 
agreement – that was the stated price of each package. Barry makes the following 
comment: 
Superficially SmallVendor looks cheap. It is worthwhile having further dialogue. We had 
MiddleVendor here for 2 weeks who were credible but superficially expensive. Is it 
worthwhile having further discussion with SmallVendor? We are duty bound from a local 
authority point of view because of price… (Procurement Team meeting). 
Yet JV Partner does not agree that SmallVendor are cheaper. They argue that the Team 
are not making a correct comparison: 
You are not comparing like with like here. The cost of the integration is not added in with 
BigVendor or SmallVendor. Moreover, SmallVendor are new to it and back-end 
integration costs money.  
It seems that the uncertainty around each of the packages continues to grow, and the 
possibility of comparison and putting the systems on a common plane more distant. To 
cool the conversation down, Barry argues for further research to be done: “Why don’t we 
find out what the position ‘is’ and not what we think…?” In contrast, Brian thinks further 
studies will only lengthen the process and that it will ‘go on for another 6 months’. Barry 
describes how: 
We are duty bound to get to the facts…Need for further work, to do it properly with some 
accuracy…we have more time than we thought we had. If it happens, it will happen in the 
  30
context of the Joint Venture. We need CRM but we don’t need to make that decision 
before we know we have the Joint Venture. Melchester will have to make that decision 
on its own, even if the Joint Venture doesn’t come off. I have no choice but to do further 
evaluation. And it won’t take 6 months…Have to show it’s properly evaluated. That 
work needs to be done jointly…Need ‘like for like’ evaluation. No good squabbling. 
Should be doing further evaluation jointly. At the end of the day we have to decide, even 
if these tensions exist (Procurement Team meeting). 
Through further research Barry imagines a process whereby the differences between each 
system could be clarified so that all the uncertainty could be reduced. Moreover, the 
downside to these delays was that the Team were finding it increasingly difficult to sift 
between the various technologies and their suppliers. While they had previously agreed 
(among themselves) that they would conduct further work on just one system 
(SmallVendor), JV Partner assume that are considering looking at two systems. On top of 
that, one IT manager within the Team (Fred) adds that if they continue to evaluate 
SmallVendor and MiddleVendor, then, for the sake of due process, they should also 
allow BigVendor back to the table. His argument is that they might “…cry foul on the 
grounds of not having had the same access”. In other words, rather than remove suppliers 
from the table, they were forced to re-admit and review all three for a third time!  
5.10. Seeing Is Believing 
We have discussed how those within the Team were laboriously attempting to shift the 
boundary concerning which assessment criteria were relevant to the selection. For 
instance, we have shown how much time was spent collecting and interpreting 
testimonies from reference sites, deciphering the provenance and status of the various 
systems, and questioning the standing of the suppliers. However, these measures were not 
sufficient to assess suppliers like BigVendor who have packages working in several local 
government sites, and as one of the largest software suppliers in the world, have a 
substantial standing among users and industry analysts alike. Thus, given there were 
many reference sites available, the Team began to invest time in visiting these sites. 
Below, we show how attending and observing a successful demonstration became a 
further comparative measure. 
5.10.1. What, Down Again! 
BigVendor appeared to have a major advantage over the other suppliers as its systems 
were already installed and working within many UK local authorities. However, when 
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members of the Team travelled to see one of these systems in use they were told that 
‘unfortunately the system was down today’. Strikingly, the same thing happened at a 
number of other BigVendor sites; and even when they made return trips they found the 
systems down once again! Christine, incredulous about the situation, describes this in one 
interview:  
…I visited a number of BigVendor sites and I haven’t yet seen their CRM solution 
working anywhere [Question: Where were those sites?]. I visited [Rochester], and we 
have been to [Lichester], and then there was a party of colleagues from the Customer 
Service Centre who went back to [Lichester] a second time 8 weeks later and there was 
nothing working then! (Interview with Christine, Customer Services). 
The difficulties were reported by the reference sites to be the result of rare (?) technical 
glitches, and despite providing re-assurances that they were indeed satisfied with the 
BigVendor solution, the Team were now beginning to express concerns. Ron, the IT 
manager, after one such visit describes how he thinks: 
Technically, BigVendor can provide a solution, I am sure of that. I don’t think I can sit 
and say there is a technical problem with their solution, I don’t think there is. I think in 
terms of their track record, which worries people, we have been to two BigVendor sites 
and haven’t seen the application running properly yet. I think there is a feeling that, ‘yes’, 
they might become the leading suppliers, and ‘yes’ they are one of the companies that the 
Government is talking to about producing standard solutions for local government. But 
right at this moment in time there is a high chance of anything produced for Melchester 
not working first time (Interview with Ron, IT Manager). 
To counter these rising concerns, BigVendor tries to persuade the Team to make another 
visit to one of its reference sites but, unsurprisingly, this was met with some reluctance. 
In a last ditch effort, BigVendor offer to run its demo via a broadband link but as there 
was no such link at Melchester the Team were invited to travel some 100 miles to one of 
BigVendor’s offices. Richard, the Project Manager, describes the Team’s reaction to this 
suggestion:  
They wanted us to go their office in [Fine City] and we said frankly that ‘If we tried to 
tell people that idea they would just [inaudible]…We suggested that that wasn’t 
appropriate [he laughs]…  
The story did not finish there. There was some further negotiations about how and with 
what technology the demo would take place before eventually it went ahead in 
Melchester’s own offices. As the Project Manager describes, this too did not end in the 
way BigVendor would have liked: “It was over a phone line, and it worked perfectly well 
over a phone line, [but] unfortunately they were showing us the wrong thing!” We never 
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actually learnt just which system the Team had been shown but whatever it was, or 
whatever had gone wrong, it was significantly embarrassing for the BigVendor to 
immediately withdraw from the procurement.  
5.10.2. That is Better… 
Given these difficulties much importance was now placed on actually seeing a system in 
operation. Thus, a few weeks later, when the Team were offered the opportunity to go 
and view the SmallVendor system that had recently been installed within Bingham 
Council they enthusiastically agreed to the trip. Also, whereas in previous visits only one 
or two people had actually made the journey, on this occasion the entire Team was 
travelling the 200 miles to visit Bingham Council. If the selection of a system depended 
so crucially on its capabilities being observed then any witnessing would have to be very 
much a ‘collective endeavour’.11  
Upon arrival at Bingham there was a round-table session where Bingham staff talked 
about their experiences working with the supplier. This was followed by a demonstration 
of the software and time spent watching operators in a live situation within a Call Centre. 
Everyone broke-off into pairs and sat with an operator watching them take calls and enter 
and retrieve data. This demo and visit appeared to go extremely well and on the train 
back to Melchester the Team chatted excitedly about what they had seen. Some weeks 
later in an interview, Christine from Customer Services still spoke highly of the visit:  
We also visited Bingham and saw their solution actually working, and it was very simple, 
the agents in the Call Centre were all delighted with it and it had made their lives a lot 
easier and it was really fast and responsive (Interview with Christine, Customer 
Services).  
What was obvious on the train journey and then in subsequent meetings was that the 
attachments various groups had made to particular solutions, and the case for prioritising 
these, were now sufficiently loosened such that all other solutions could be sifted out. Of 
course, there was still the awkward job of notifying the JV Partner, but it was now clear 
that a decision had finally been taken and the procurement was all but over. This raises a 
final question in relation to the demo: Why had it taken on such importance, which was 
surely incommensurate to the amount of information it provided?  
                                                 
11 Shapin & Schaffer (1989) in their book on 19th Century gentlemen scientists argue that ‘multiplicity’ was important during the witnessing of early experiments 
and had to be a ‘collective act’ so as to avoid reliance on any one radical individual. 
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As we have said, the comparative measures operated as a kind of scaffolding which was 
being erected around the systems in order to understand its shape and boundaries (i.e. to 
whom they were connected and on what they depended). What had been unclear at the 
outset but was now evident was that MiddleVendor did not yet have a finished version of 
what they were offering Melchester. Moreover, though they were able to provide 
reference sites, the Team were unwilling to imagine the software seen there (in rather 
different settings) working in their own setting. Melchester were unable to disentangle 
the technology from these sites; unable to envisage the whole solution, they recast 
MiddleVendor’s proposal as containing only ‘bits and bobs’ of software. Similarly, 
whilst MiddleVendor had offered a ‘Proof of Concept’ in lieu of an actual demonstration 
of a finished system, this was not seen to be sufficient proof that they were capable of 
turning these bits and bobs into a package that might suit Melchester. As ‘guinea pigs’ 
Melchester would be entirely reliant on MiddleVendor’s word.  
Alternatively, BigVendor did have many local government reference sites in the UK (and 
parallels between Melchester and these could easily be drawn) but, surprisingly, was 
unable to demonstrate its software (or at least the correct software). As Shapin and 
Schaffer (1989) suggest there is much to be gained but also much to be lost during 
demonstrations. Demonstrations are rarely spontaneous events: adopters wish to observe 
the technology in everyday use, and will seemingly give much importance to these 
events, even though they know that the demonstration has been ‘staged’ specifically for 
their benefit. Their purpose among other things was to reveal some features – 
characteristics of the software - that up till then had been invisible to the Team, but in 
attempting to do this BigVendor ended up revealing some quite different characteristics 
(about themselves). To some extent, of course, demonstrations are not simply about 
evaluating systems but also evaluating suppliers. The question the Team might have 
asked themselves was: If the supplier cannot stage that which is expected to be staged, in 
the safe internal environment of their customers, then how might they deal with systems 
out there in the real world?). 
This left SmallVendor which was only able to offer the one site but this was seemingly 
similar enough to provide sufficient parallels. What was specifically interesting about the 
demo at SmallVendor was not simply that the Team could see a software package in 
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action but it was also one of the few times the Team were able to establish an uncontested 
comparison between the different systems. We say ‘uncontested’ because every other 
measure up till then (price, risk, reputation, availability of a package, etc) was the basis of 
further disagreement and uncertainty. In the case of the demo, things appeared much less 
equivocal. The Team had successfully translated the assessment process into a specific 
requirement, indeed necessity, that the software be demonstrated and this demonstration 
be witnessed. In other words, to return to our earlier discussion of the performativity of 
procurement, they had finally established a place where the differences betweens 
systems/suppliers could be actualised. The demo became the means by which the systems 
were finally put on a common plane; the procurement was no longer simply an 
intellectual exercise but the entire Team could witness directly with their own eyes a 
‘visual’ comparison between the systems.12 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
From the point of view of economics, management and engineering accounts, the 
procurement of technologies is seen to be the result of a formal process in which 
information about the properties of objects is assessed against a narrow set of pre-
specified decision criteria. By contrast, critical interpretations informed by constructivist 
and cultural sociology reject this view, portraying technology selection as the outcome of 
more informal social processes in which the micro-politics of the organisation 
overshadow the substance of the selection procedure. In particular many follow a 
‘Woolgarian’ type view in which the technical properties of the different systems and the 
decision criteria, if not entirely removed from the equation altogether, are seen as 
‘indeterminate’ to that decision. While constructivist tools are well honed for unpicking 
the political moves underlying technical discourse and seek to demonstrate how micro-
politics are in command and decisions divorced from formal assessment, we argue that 
technology selection cannot be fully understood unless we more fully consider the role of 
assessment criteria.  
In the case presented here, we have shown that the procurement decision was not a purely 
political device in the ways that radical constructivism might suggest (even though it had 
                                                 
12 Particular, and perhaps disproportionate, weight was given to this, most direct form of evidence of system performance; even though it did not per se resolve 
uncertainties about system properties, it seemed to have particular impact in aligning opinion. 
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an important ritual and dramatic element). The decision occurred in a context 
characterised by high levels of uncertainty, where the properties of the different offerings 
and the decision criteria were negotiable and indeed openly and covertly contested. 
Added to this, the relationship between the council and its joint venture partner was 
teetering on the brink of failure. However, utilising Callon’s concept of the 
performativity of economic concepts and tools, we have shown how the Procurement 
Team sought to push away arguments that came from outside the boundaries of the 
choice, to edge around controversies, and to drag the procurement from the informal 
domain onto a more formal, accountable plane. In other words, they attempted to 
‘disentangle’ the vendors and their systems, and ‘frame’ the procurement so that 
organisational politics were, as far as possible, kept at bay from the decision. Their 
efforts involved the laborious construction of a ‘like for like’ comparison: that is, 
attempts to draw out and compare those properties which were deemed to be significant, 
and to lay them on a common plane. To this effect we saw how the Team wove into the 
process a ‘system of comparison’ or a number of ‘comparative measures’.  
These included elements set prior to and outside of the array of actors involved in the 
procurement, along with others put in place in the process of reaching a decision. Firstly, 
there were attempts to collect and interpret testimonies from reference sites, – though the 
evidence obtained was often uniformly positive and thus provided little opportunity to 
differentiate suppliers. Secondly, much time went into establishing the provenance and 
status of the software packages and there were discussions of what kinds of objects with 
what kind of biographies and careers the Council were willing to accept (a package built 
from scratch, one constructed for other industries, or a partially formed local government 
package). Thirdly, where the Team were unable (or simply unwilling) to ‘imagine’ a 
finished system from the ‘bits and bobs’ they were shown, or to make the necessary 
parallels between their setting and the references sites, there was a requirement for 
suppliers to show that they could also make their systems work within the Council. In 
other words they were being asked to provide evidence of technical competence. 
Fourthly, there were attempts to assess the standing of suppliers, as a measure of their 
current and future performance, by asking external experts to comment on and investigate 
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that standing. Finally, it became increasingly important for the suppliers to demonstrate 
their systems and that the Team could bear direct witness to these demonstrations.  
We describe these comparative measures as stabilised forms of accountability - albeit a 
loosely-coupled form of accountability which left considerable discretion for actors. We 
suggested that these operate as a kind of ‘scaffolding’ erected during the move towards 
the procurement decision. These measures – this scaffolding – as they are put into place 
gradually give a shape to assessments of the various systems (i.e. their boundaries are 
mapped out, and it is shown on what they depend and who they are connected to). Our 
argument is that it was not so much the properties of the systems which were important 
for establishing differences and similarities between the various software packages but 
the enactment of these various assessment criteria which give a form to those properties.  
When there were difficulties and uncertainties these have to be interpreted not as 
uncertainties about directly ascertained properties but, rather, as uncertainties 
surrounding the measures that calculate properties. Each of the different comparative 
measures had different explanatory power (and thus there was a constant need to shift 
between measures to stabilise the artefacts). We saw a shift from the notion of 
procurement as an exercise in imagination or even enchantment (i.e., where the Team 
were asked to ‘imagine’ how a system in a reference site would work within their own 
setting); to an exercise in trust based upon testimony (where the team were asked to 
assess testimonies and expert judgements); and finally to more concrete ‘visual’ exercise 
(where the Team could witness demonstrations). It was by shifting between measures that 
the technologies were eventually ranked and sifted; that they could be disentangled from 
the reference sites and the supplier, and that their differences could be shown. In other 
words, that the procurement could be framed.  
What was also interesting about our case is that most members of the Team appeared to 
have a hand in the decision, to be satisfied with the process, to think their views had been 
included, and that the outcome (although it meant giving up their initial preference) was 
the correct one. This latter aspect (how the Team members shifted vendor preferences) is 
the most interesting. Callon & Muniesa (2004) have discussed how measures may be 
imposed by specialists groups. In our case the Team ended up evaluating the packages 
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(not through the measures that were initially touted – such as fit, price, the packages’ 
potential for updating processes etc) but through sets of measures that were proposed to 
them – maybe in some cases imposed on them – by their (more technical) colleagues. 
However, perhaps the notion ‘impose’ is too strong in our case. No one member of the 
Team were able to completely frame the process: new sites of tension were continiously 
opening up; the new measures were subject to continuous ‘overflowing’. This was most 
evident in instances where assessment criteria were recast: these included MiddleVendor 
attempting to sidestep their lack of a demonstrator by offering a ‘Proof of Concept’; 
MiddleVendor’s benign proposal that Melchester be a ‘pilot site’, which was 
subsequently reinterpreted by hostile local actors that they were actually being used as a 
‘guinea pig’; and JV Partner’s ultimately unsuccessful attempt to introduce the notion of 
‘risk’ as a further assessment criteria. The scaffolding metaphor addresses, on the one 
hand, the continued spaces for negotiation and discretion about what new criteria and 
methods should be introduced and how they should be applied – and as we saw, these 
reconfigurations could give rise to ‘surprising’ outcomes.13 On the other, the outcomes 
were not wholly open but were structured, subject to various kinds of local and broader 
accountability. For instance, we saw how the assessment process became increasingly 
constrained as different planks of the scaffold were put into place and the parties moved 
towards a decision. Procurement of course takes place in a range of contexts, with more 
or less well-established evaluation criteria and subject to different levels and types of 
accountability. And as we saw in this case, accountability may change. The actors’ 
awareness of formal requirements such as the fair trading legislation changed the 
parameters of this discretion - enacting a tighter form of accountability. In other words, 
the transparency that was required within the OJEC had a determinate effect on the 
conduct of decisions.  
To conclude, technology choice and purchase should not be reduced to one single 
dimension (either the outcome of rational decision making or the result of discursive 
struggles). Rather, it is the tension between these two positions that is interesting and 
should be explored – this cycle of disentangling, framing and overflowing. What our 
story highlights is that though laborious, comparison is possible. In this respect, we need 
                                                 
13 Here we echo Jørgensen and Sørensen’s (1999) concept of ‘surprises’ in discussing radical reconfigurations of inter-organisational development arenas. 
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to understand in greater detail this ‘grey space’ that exist between rationalistic accounts 
of technology and cultural sociological accounts. Theorising these grey spaces as well as 
the actors who inhabit and are able to speak in them is crucial for analysing technical 
change. In terms of the former, there is a need to accept that the comparative measures 
identified here constitute a form of assessment (they are not simply a ‘rhetorical ploy’). 
In terms of the latter, we point to the emergence of new kinds of experts who accept and 
work with this more amorphous kind of knowledge (see particularly Herschel & Collins, 
2005) and argue that these experts and their organisations need to be studied. In other 
words, the challenge for researchers addressing technology choice, within Information 
Systems research or Technology Studies, is to develop tools honed for understanding the 
space established between techno-economic accounts and more cultural sociological 
approaches. 
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